In this paper, I present two ampliative adaptive logics: LA and LA k . LA is an adaptive logic for abduction that enables one to generate explanatory hypotheses from a set of observational statements and a set of background assumptions. LA k is based on LA and has the peculiar property that it selects those explanatory hypotheses that are empirically most successful. The aim of LA k is to capture the notion of empirical progress as studied by Theo Kuipers.
Introduction
In his From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism, Kuipers presents a detailed analysis of the notion of empirical progress (the replacement of an old theory by a new and better one), and its relation to confirmation on the one hand and to truth approximation on the other. On Kuipers' account, a theory X should be eliminated in favour of a theory Y if and only if Y has so far proven to be more successful than X. Intuitively, a theory Y is more successful than a theory X if and only if Y saves the empirical successes of X, faces at most the same empirical problems as X, and is better in at least one of these respects.
In order to evaluate the empirical successes and the empirical problems of a theory (or hypothesis), Kuipers relies on the hypothetico-deductive (HD-) method. Central to this method is the derivation of observational statements from the hypotheses under consideration together with a set of background assumptions B. The logic that is used for these derivations is Classical Logic (henceforth CL). Thus, according to the HD-method, an observational statement O is an empirical success for a hypothesis H iff B ∪ {H} CL O, and O is true; O is an empirical problem for H iff B ∪ {H} CL O, and ¬O is true.
1 Where S and S refer to the sets of empirical successes of H and H , and P and P to their sets of empirical problems, the notion of "empirically more successful" is defined by H is empirically more successful than H iff S ⊃ S and P ⊆ P, or S ⊇ S and P ⊂ P.
Three remarks are important. First, the conclusion that H is more successful than H is relative to the set of background assumptions B, and the set of observational statements O. For instance, discovering new empirical problems for H may lead to the withdrawal of the conclusion that H is more successful than H. Next, according to Kuipers' definition, hypotheses may be incomparable with respect to their empirical success. For instance, if S ⊆ S , and S ⊆ S, then H and H are 'equally successful'. To avoid confusion, I shall say that a hypothesis H is maximally successful with respect to some set B ∪ O iff no hypothesis H is more successful with respect to B ∪ O than H. Finally, to decide that O is an empirical success (respectively empirical problem) for H, one does not need to reason from H. Indeed, if B ∪ {H} CL O, then B CL H ⊃ O. Hence, O can be considered as an empirical success for H if B CL H ⊃ O and O is true.
This last remark suggests a method for identifying the hypotheses that are maximally successful (given a set of background assumptions and the available evidence) that is different from the method followed by Kuipers. Kuipers derives consequences from the hypotheses under consideration (together with some appropriate set of background assumptions), and next confronts these consequences with the relevant observational statements. This confrontation enables him to compare the successes and problems of the individual hypotheses, and to identify those hypotheses that are maximally successful. An alternative would be to infer the maximally successful hypotheses from the set of background assumptions and the set of observational statements. Evidently, the logic behind this method would not be CL, but some ampliative logic that enables one to infer formulas of the form H from formulas of the form H ⊃ O and O.
In the present paper, I shall explore this alternative method, and discuss the logic LA k on which it is based. One of the requirements for LA k is to capture the notion of empirical progress as defined by Kuipers. Thus, LA k should enable one to infer from a set of background assumptions B and a set of observational statements O those hypotheses H that are maximally successful according to Kuipers' definition. As one may expect, the inference relation of LA k is non-monotonic. This is in line with the fact that, on Kuipers' analysis, adding new empirical evidence may lead to a revision of what the maximally successful hypotheses are.
A central observation for the design of the logic LA k is that "maximally successful with respect to" is (at the predicative level) not only undecidable, but that there even is no positive test for it.
2 This has several important consequences. One consequence is that the reasoning process by which one arrives at the conclusion that H is maximally successful with respect to B ∪ O 2 In CL, "to follow from" is undecidable, but it has a positive test. The latter means that if one constructed a proof of A from Γ, one may be sure that A follows from Γ, and if A follows from Γ, there is bound to 'exist' a proof of A from Γ, even if we may never find it. This does not obtain for "is maximally successful with respect to". Even if H is maximally successful with respect to B ∪ O, there need not exist any finite construction that establishes this.
is not only non-monotonic, but also dynamic.
3 A simple example may clarify this. Suppose that, at some moment in time, one derived from B the following consequences:
Suppose further that O consists of:
If all consequences of B that link H 1 and H 2 to observational statements follow from (1)-(4), one may conclude that both H 1 and H 2 are maximally successful with respect to B ∪ O. However, for undecidable fragments, it may be impossible to establish that some statement, say H 1 ⊃ O 2 , is not derivable from B. In view of this, no reasoning can warrant that both H 1 and H 2 are maximally successful with respect to B ∪ O.
In the absence of such an absolute warrant, the only rational alternative is to derive conclusions on the basis of one's best insights. It immediately follows from this that a deepening of one's insights may lead to the withdrawal of previously derived conclusions. Thus, in the example above, it seems justified to conclude that H 1 as well as H 2 are maximally successful with respect to B ∪ O. If, however, at a later moment in time, H 1 ⊃ O 2 is derived from B, one has to reject the conclusion that H 2 is maximally successful.
The lack of a positive test has another important consequence. Kuipers' definition of "more successful" is static: it is relative to a given body of knowledge, but does not depend on the evolving understanding of that body. Even for undecidable contexts, such a static definition is indispensable: it determines what the final conclusions are that should be reached or 'approached'. However, for practical and computational purposes we also need a definition of "more successful at some moment in time". The latter definition should refer to the understanding of the relevant knowledge.
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The dynamic definition of "maximally successful at some moment in time" is not only important in view of the absence of a positive test. As Kuipers himself observes (see [12, p. 112] ), his (static) definition presupposes that one checks, for every registered problem that one hypothesis faces, whether it is also a problem for any of the other hypotheses, and similarly for the successes. This presupposition is unrealistic, even for decidable contexts. Due to the fact that resources are limited, scientists often have to decide which hypotheses are maximally successful without being able to check all known problems and successes for every hypothesis under consideration. So, also here one needs the notion of "maximally successful at some moment in time".
The logic that I present in this paper has a dynamic proof theory. A line that is added at some stage of the proof may at a later stage be marked (as no longer derivable) in view of the understanding of the premises offered by the proof at that stage. At a still later stage, the line may be unmarked again. Formulas that occur on non-marked lines will be considered as derived at that stage. These formulas will enable us to define the notion of "maximally successful at some moment in time". In addition to this, the logic will enable us to define Kuipers' (static) notion of "maximally successful". The latter definition is needed to guarantee that different dynamic proofs lead 'in the end' to the same set of conclusions.
Thanks to its dynamic character, LA k nicely captures Kuipers' notion of empirical progress. If at some moment in time a hypothesis H turns out to be more successful than a hypothesis H-for instance, because new empirical successes are added (or discovered) for H -then H will be withdrawn in favour of H . Importantly, this withdrawal is governed by the logic itself, and hence, does not depend on a decision of the user.
The techniques that led to the logic LA k derive from the adaptive logic programme. The first adaptive logic was designed by Diderik Batens around 1980 (see [2] ), and was meant to handle in a sensible and realistic way inconsistent sets of premises. This logic was followed by other inconsistency-adaptive systems (see, for instance, [19] and [14] ), and the idea of an adaptive logic was generalized to other forms of logical abnormalities, such as negation-completeness, and ambiguity (see [3] for an adaptive logic that can handle all CL-abnomalities). An important new development concerns the design of ampliative adaptive logics (see [13] for an informal introduction). These logics are designed to handle various forms of ampliative reasoning. At the moment, (formal) results are available on adaptive logics for compatibility ( [7] ), for pragmatic truth ( [15] ), for the closed world assumption and negation as failure ( [20] ), for diagnostic reasoning ( [21] and [9] ), for induction ( [5] ), for abduction ( [8] ), [16] , and [18] ), for question generation ( [17] ), and for the analysis of metaphors ( [10] and [11] ). An informal discussion of adaptive logics for analogies can be found in [13] . Also LA k is an example of an ampliative adaptive logic. As some readers may have noticed, there are resemblances between the method proposed in this paper (to infer the maximally successful hypotheses from a set of background assumptions and observational statements) and abduction (in the sense of Modus Ponens in the reversed direction). As mentioned in the previous paragraph, adaptive logics are available for this particular form of reasoning. Like LA k , these logics enable one to generate explanatory hypotheses for a set of observational statements. However, they do not take into account the success of these hypotheses. LA k differs from them in that it only delivers those explanatory hypotheses that are maximally successful.
LA k is based on a new adaptive logic for abduction LA. LA exhibits several differences with the adaptive logics of abduction presented in [8] and [16] . One is that LA validates inferences of the form A ⊃ B, B / A, whereas the logics from [8] and [16] only validate inferences of the form (∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α)), B(β) / A(β). Another difference is that, in LA, abduced hypotheses are not rejected when they are falsified. As we shall see, both properties are needed for a reconstruction of Kuipers' notion of empirical progress.
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I shall proceed as follows. First, I briefly discuss the basic ideas of adaptive logics (Section 2). Next, I present the logic LA that constitutes the basis for LA k (Section 3), and show how it can be transformed into the logic LA k (Section 4). Finally, I present some concluding remarks and some open problems (Section 5).
Some Basics of Adaptive Logics
The enormous strength of adaptive logics is that they provide a unified framework for the formal study of reasoning processes that are non-monotonic and/or dynamic. 6 One of the main characteristics of such processes is that a specified set of inference rules is applied in a conditional way: they are applied on the condition that one or more formulas are not derived. If this condition is no longer satisfied, then previously drawn conclusions may be rejected. This also holds true for the application context that interests us here: an explanatory hypothesis H is derived from a set B ∪ O on the condition that H is maximally successful with respect to B ∪ O. If this condition is no longer satisfied-an explanatory hypothesis H is inferred that is more successful with respect to B ∪ O than H-H as well as all inferences that rely on H are rejected.
Adaptive logics capture this dynamics. The mechanism by which this is realized is actually very simple, both at the semantic and the syntactic level. In this paper, however, I shall restrict myself to the proof theory. The general idea behind the proof theory of an adaptive logic is that there are two kinds of inference rules: unconditional rules and conditional rules. If a formula is added by the application of a conditional rule, a 'condition' that is specified by the rule is written to the right of the line. If a formula is added by the application of an unconditional rule, no condition is introduced, but the conditions (if any) that affect the premises of the application are conjoined for its conclusion. At each stage of the proof-with each formula added-one or more 'marking criteria' are invoked: for each line that has a condition attached to it, it is checked whether the condition is fulfilled or not. If it is not, the line is marked. The formulas derived at a stage are those that, at that stage, occur on non-marked lines.
All adaptive logics available today are based on CL. They can, however, be divided into two categories: corrective and ampliative. Corrective adaptive logics are obtained by turning some of the inference rules of CL into conditional rules. Inconsistency-adaptive logics are typical examples in this category. Ampliative adaptive logics are obtained by adding some conditional rules to CL. They thus lead (in general) to a richer consequence set than CL. The logics presented in this paper are ampliative. 5 The logics for abduction that are presented in [18] also validate inferences of the form A ⊃ B, B / A. However, they do not enable one to infer hypotheses that are empirically falsified.
6 Dynamic reasoning processes are not necessarily non-monotonic. In [4] it is shown, for instance, that the pure logic of relevant implication can be characterized by a dynamic proof theory.
7 For most adaptive logics available today the proof theory as well as the semantics have been designed, and the soundness and completeness proofs have been presented. In view of these results, the design of the semantics for LA and LA k is rather straightforward.
The proof theory for an adaptive logic may be direct or indirect. The proof theory of an adaptive logic that is based on some logic L is direct if it proceeds in terms of L, and indirect if it proceeds in terms of some other system, for instance a modal one. Especially in the case of ampliative adaptive logics, an indirect proof theory is usually much more attractive. The reason for this is not difficult to understand. Ampliative inferences typically lead to conclusions that are compatible 8 with (a subset of) the premises. 9 These conclusions, however, are not necessarily jointly compatible with the premises. For instance, both A and ¬A may be inferred as explanatory hypotheses for the same set of explananda.
In view of this, restrictions are needed to avoid that mutually inconsistent conclusions lead to triviality. Formulating these restrictions in terms of CL leads to a proof theory that is quite complex and not very transparent. They can, however, easily be formulated in terms of a modal logic.
The transition to a modal approach is actually very simple. If Γ CL A, then A is true in all models of Γ. What this comes to, in modal terms, is that ¬A is impossible (¬3¬A), or, in other words, that A is necessary (2A). If A is compatible with Γ, then A is true in some model of Γ, but not necessarily in all of them. In line with all this, it seems sensible to consider the members of Γ as necessarily true, and the sentences that are compatible with Γ as possibly true.
This idea is used in [7] to design an adaptive logic for compatibility that is called COM. COM is based on S5, and is defined with respect to sets of premises of the form Γ 2 = {2A | A ∈ Γ}. As is shown in [7] , COM has the interesting property that Γ 2 COM 3A iff Γ CL ¬A, and hence, iff A is compatible with Γ. Note that this transition to a modal approach immediately solves the problem concerning mutually inconsistent conclusions (in view of
3A, 3¬A B).
The logics presented here share their general format with COM: premises are treated as necessarily true, and conclusions arrived at by ampliative steps as possibly true. So, the proof theory will not rely on
There is, however, a small complication. This is related to the fact that 2B 2(A ⊃ B), for arbitrary A, and that 2¬A 2(A ⊃ B), for arbitrary B. In view of this, it has to be avoided that the application of (9) leads to arbitrary explanations.
There are several options to solve this difficulty. One option is to formulate a suitably restricted form of (9) . Another option is to presuppose that there is a clear distinction between the set of observational statements Γ 1 and the set of background assumptions Γ 2 and to require that (9) can only be applied if
, whereas 2B and 2¬A are not. In order to obtain a logic for abduction that is as general as possible, I followed the second option in the design of LA.
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The easiest way to realize this option is to rely on a bimodal version of S5-let us call it S5
2 . The language of S5 2 includes two necessity operators ("2 1 " and "2 2 "), and two possibility operators ("3 1 " and "3 2 "). To simplify things, I shall only consider modal formulas of first degree-a modal formal formula is said to be of first degree if it contains one or more modal operators, but none of these is inside the scope of any other modal operator. A formula that does not contain any modal operator will be said to be of degree zero.
The operator "2 1 " will be used for the observational statements, and "2 2 " for the background assumptions. S5
2 will be defined in such a way that 2 1 A is derivable from 2 2 A, but not vice versa. This ensures, on the one hand, that the information from both sets of premises can be conjoined (to derive predictions, for instance), and, on the other hand, that it remains possible to recognize which sentences are derivable from the background assumptions alone.
So, the general idea is this. LA and LA k are ampliative adaptive logics based on CL. To avoid the derivation of arbitrary explanations, their consequence relation is defined with respect to couples Σ = Γ 1 , Γ 2 , in which Γ 1 and Γ 2 are sets of closed formulas of the standard predicative language. It is assumed that Γ 1 is the set of observational statements, and Γ 2 the set of background assumptions. The proof theories of LA and LA k are defined with respect to modal adaptive logics based on S5
2 . These will be called MA and MA k . It will be stipulated that A is an LA-consequence (respectively LA k -consequence) of some theory Γ iff 3A is an MA-consequence (respectively MA k -consequence) of the modal translation of Γ.
A Simple Adaptive Logic for Abduction
Let L be the standard predicative language of CL, and let L M be obtained from L by extending it with "2 1 ", "2 2 ", "3 1 ", and "3 2 ". Let the set of wffs of L M , W M , be restricted to wffs of degree zero and first degree. Syntactically, S5 2 is obtained by extending an axiomatization of the full predicative fragment of CL with every instance (for i ∈ {1, 2}) of the following axioms, rule, and definition:
Axioms A1-A2 are the usual axioms for S5 adapted to the bimodal case. As W M contains only wffs of degree zero and first degree, no axiom is needed for the reduction of iterated modal operators. Axiom A3 warrants that "2 2 " is stronger than "2 1 ": 2 2 A implies 2 1 A, but not vice versa. Note that, in view of A3 and D 3 , 3 1 A implies 3 2 A, but that the converse does not hold.
The relation between MA and LA is given by Definition 1.
Let us now turn to the proof theory for MA. As is usual for adaptive logics, MA-proofs consist of lines that have five elements: (i) a line number, (ii) the formula A that is derived, (iii) the line numbers of the formulas from which A is derived, (iv) the rule by which A is derived, and (v) a condition. The condition has to be satisfied in order for A to be so derivable.
The condition will either be ∅ or a couple of the form Φ, Θ in which Φ contains one closed formula and Θ is a set of closed formulas. A line of the form
will be read as "C provided that A is a good explanation for B 1 , . . . , B n ". Evidently, the phrase "is a good explanation for" may be interpreted in different ways. Here, I shall choose for a minimal interpretation that is most adequate in view of the design of LA k . As we shall see below, this interpretation does not require that a good explanation is not falsified. It does require, however, that it is compatible with the background assumptions-the reason for this will become clear below.
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The proof format of MA follows the generic proof format for adaptive logics that is presented in [6] . In addition to a premise rule RP, I shall introduce an unconditional rule RU, a conditional rule RC, and three marking criteria. The latter determine when a line should be marked (as no longer derivable). A wff will be said to be derived unconditionally iff it is derived on a line the fifth element of which is empty.
Intuitively, a line is marked if its condition is not (no longer) satisfied. Thus, in line with the interpretation of the condition (see above), the marking criteria determine which requirements a hypothesis A and a set of explananda B 1 , . . . , B m should meet so that A is a good explanation for B 1 , . . . , B m . I shall come back to the marking criteria later.
Let us first look at the three generic rules that govern MA-proofs from Σ 2 . After listing them, I shall briefly comment on each of them.
RP If A ∈ Σ 2 , then one may add to the proof a line consisting of (i) the appropriate line number, (ii) A, (iii) "−", (iv) "RP", and
. . , A n occur in the proof, and (c) at most one of the A i occurs on a non-empty condition ∆, then one may add to the proof a line consisting of: 11 The minimal interpretation that is followed here may be strengthened in several ways. The systems presented in [8] , for instance, require that a good explanation, among other things, is not falsified. As it should be, the rule RP warrants that all premises are introduced unconditionally (on a line the fifth element of which is empty).
As for the rule RU, note that it enables one to conjoin formulas that are conditionally derived to formulas that are unconditionally derived. This is important, because it warrants that explanatory hypotheses can be used to derive predictions from the background assumptions. The rule RU does not enable one, however, to conjoin explanatory hypotheses to one another (it cannot be applied if more than one of the A i occurs on a non-empty condition). By using a somewhat more complex format for the condition, the rule RU can easily be generalized to such inferences. However, as we are not interested in MA itself, and as the generalization would not lead to a richer consequence set for LA (in view of 3 i A, 3 i B S5 2 3 i (A∧B)) and Definition 1), this would only complicate matters.
The rule RC warrants that the conclusion of an abductive inference is always preceded by "3 2 ". Also this is important: if explanatory hypotheses would be preceded by "3 1 ", their falsification would lead to triviality (see also the example below).
From RU and RC, several rules can be derived that make the proofs more interesting from a heuristic point of view. The following one, the predicative version of RC, will be useful in the examples below: Let me illustrate the proof theory with a very simple example. Suppose one observes a new heavenly body (call it "a") that seems too large to be a star, but that at the same time does not seem to move around the sun. Suppose further one believes, on the one hand, that a star appears as a small heavenly body that does not move around the sun and does not have a tail, and on the other hand, that a comet appears as a large heavenly body that moves around the sun and that has a tail. Let us agree on the following letters to formalize our explananda and our background assumptions:
S "is a star" C "is a comet" H "is a heavenly body" L "appears large" M "moves around the sun" T "has a tail" This is how the result could look like-I omit brackets in the case of continuous conjunctions:
From 4 we can derive by RU that stars are heavenly bodies that do not move around the sun:
The rule RD can now be applied to infer Sa on the condition that Sa is a good explanation for Ha and ¬M a:
In an analogous way, Ca can be inferred on the condition that Ca is a good explanation for Ha and La:
From 2 and 4, it can be inferred that ¬Sa holds true:
What this comes to is that the explanatory hypothesis that occurs on line 7 is empirically falsified. Thanks to the bimodal approach, however, this does not lead to problems-I leave it to the reader to check that neither 2 2 ¬Sa nor 3 1 Sa is derivable. In view of 3 and 5, it can be inferred that also the hypothesis on line 9 is falsified: 11 2 1 ¬Ca 3, 5 RU ∅ Although they are empirically falsified, both hypotheses can be used to derive predictions:
12 3 2 T a 5, 9 RU {Ca}, {Ha, La} 13 3 2 ¬T a 4, 7 RU {Sa}, {Ha, ¬M a} Note that the derivation of predictions does not lead to the introduction of a new condition, but that the conditions of the lines to which RU is applied are preserved. This will guarantee that the predictions are no longer derivable when the explanatory hypotheses on which they rely are withdrawn. Note also that the predictions are mutually inconsistent, but that this cannot lead to arbitrary conclusions (in view of 3 i A, 3 i B S5 2 3 i (A ∧ B) ).
Let us now turn to the marking criteria-the criteria that determine when the condition of a line is satisfied, and thus, fix the meaning of "is a good explanation for". As mentioned above, I shall not demand that a good explanation is not empirically falsified. I shall demand, however, that it satisfies three basic requirements without which the very notion of explaining would become superfluous.
The first requirement is that the explanation should not be trivial-in view of 2 i B S5 2 2 i (A ⊃ B), for arbitrary A, and 2 i ¬A S5 2 2 i (A ⊃ B), for arbitrary B (see above). The second is that the explanatory hypothesis should not be derivable from one of the explananda. This is needed to rule out (partial) self-explanations. For instance, we want neither B nor A ∨ B as an explanation for B. Cases like this are ruled out by requiring that the truth of the explanatory hypothesis is not warranted by the truth of one of the explananda (or, that the explanans is not derivable from one of the explananda). The third and final requirement is that the explanatory hypothesis should be as parsimonious as possible. This is especially important in view of the fact that
, and hence, that one needs to prevent that A ∧ D can be abduced, whenever A can.
To each of these requirements corresponds a marking criterion-respectively called T -marking, S-marking and P -marking. The first of these, that for ruling out trivial explanations, is straightforward:
CMT A line that has {A}, Θ as its fifth element is T -marked iff (i) for some B ∈ Θ, 2 2 B occurs in the proof, or (ii) 2 2 ¬A occurs in the proof.
Note that, if a line is T -marked, it remains T -marked at any further stage of the proof. Note also that, in view of (ii) of RMT, it is required that an explanatory hypothesis is compatible with the background assumptions. The criterion for ruling out (partial) self-explanations involves only a small complication, namely that one should be able to recognize, in the proof, that some explanatory hypothesis A is entailed by some explanandum B. I shall assume that this is done by deriving 2 i (B ⊃ A) on a line j such that, at line j, the path of 2 i (B ⊃ A) does not include any premise.
12 Expressions of the form π j (A) will refer to the path of a formula A as it occurs on line j. To keep things simple, I first define a set π
Definition 2 Where A is the second element of line j, π
• j (A) is the smallest set Λ that satisfies: (i) j ∈ Λ, and (ii) if k ∈ Λ, and l 1 , . . . , l n is the third element of line k, then l 1 , . . . , l n ∈ Λ. Here is the second marking criterion: CMS A line that has {A}, Θ as its fifth element is S-marked iff, for some B ∈ Θ, a line j occurs in the proof such that (i) 2 i (B ⊃ A) is its second element, and
The final criterion requires a bit more explanation. As mentioned above, it has to be prevented that A ∧ D can be abduced, whenever A can-in view
. This can be solved by requiring that the explanatory hypothesis is as parsimonious as possible. However, selecting the most parsimonious explanatory hypotheses can be realized in different ways. The most obvious one is to warrant that, whenever A and C explain the same set of explananda, and C is (according to one's best insights) logically weaker than A, A is rejected in favour of C. This, however, raises a further problem. If one would simply select the logically weakest explanatory hypothesis, it would be impossible to generate alternative explanations for the same set of explanandain view of
In some application contexts, this is exactly what one wants. For instance, in the context of medical diagnosis, one is interested in the weakest explanation: whenever two or more explanations can be abduced for the same set of symptoms, one will only accept their disjunction. 13 In other contexts, however, one wants to be able to generate alternative explanations for the same set of explananda. This holds true, for instance, for the case that interests us here: comparing the empirical success of different hypotheses only makes sense if one is able to generate alternative explanations for the same set of explananda.
In this paper, I shall present a very simple solution to the problem that relies on the complexity of formulas-by the complexity of a formula I shall refer to the number of binary connectives that occur in it (if a formula contains no binary connectives, its complexity will be said to be zero).
14 The basic idea is this: if two explanations A and C are available for a set of explananda B 1 , . . . , B m , and A entails C, then A should be withdrawn in favour of C, provided that the complexity of the former is greater than that of the latter. Thus, if p ∧ q and p are alternative explanations for the same set of explananda, the former should be withdrawn in favour of the latter (because p ∧ q entails p, and moreover the complexity of the former is greater than that of the latter). If, however, the alternative explanations are p ∧ q and (p ∧ q) ∨ r, then p ∧ q should not be withdrawn (although p ∧ q entails (p ∧ q) ∨ r, its complexity is smaller than that of (p ∧ q) ∨ r).
Let c(A) denote the complexity of A. The criterion for P -marking can now be formulated as follows:
CMP A line that has {A}, Θ as its fifth element is P -marked iff (i) some line in the proof that is neither T -marked nor S-marked has {C}, Θ as its fifth element (for some C), (ii) 2 i (A ⊃ C) occurs on a line i such that π i (2 i (A ⊃ C))∩(Γ 1 ∪Γ 2 ) = ∅, and (iii) c(A) > c(C).
I immediately add four remarks to this. First, to keep the proof theory as realistic as possible, also this criterion refers to distinctions that have been made in the proof (this is why (ii) does not refer to the fact that A entails C, but to the fact that it has been recognized that A entails C).
Secondly, formulas that are P -marked at some stage may at a later stage be unmarked (for instance, because, at some stage, A is P -marked in view of C which is itself, at a later stage, T -marked or S-marked).
Thirdly, as the criterion for P -marking refers to the other two criteria (and as P -marked lines may at a later stage be unmarked), the easiest way to perform the marking is as follows: first, remove all P -marks; next, check which lines have to be marked according to CMT and CMS; finally, check which lines have to be marked according to CMP.
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Finally, if a formula A contains some 'irrelevant' letters, 16 A may be marked in view of another formula C that is logically equivalent to it. For instance, as soon is it established that (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ ¬q) entails p, the former will be marked in view of the latter. 17 This seems justified in view of the fact that one should try to formulate an explanatory hypothesis in the simplest way possible.
Let me illustrate the marking criteria with a simple propositional example. Suppose that Γ 1 = {p, q}, and Γ 2 = {r ⊃ p, s ∧ p, p ⊃ ¬t, t ⊃ q, u ⊃ q}. In view of RP, both the observational statements and the background assumptions may be introduced on an empty condition, the former preceded by "2 1 ", the latter by "2 2 ":
In view of RC, 3 2 r may be derived from 1 and 3, on the condition that r is a good explanation for p:
However, from 4, one may derive:
15 Evidently, this procedure has to be repeated whenever a line is added to the proof. 16 I say that a letter occurs irrelevantly in A iff A is logically equivalent to a formula C in which that letter does not occur.
17 This is a further difference with the solution proposed in [18] : there, logically equivalent formulas are never marked in view of one another. 18 To illustrate the dynamical character of the proof, I shall each time give the complete proof, but, for reasons of space, omit lines that are not needed to see the dynamics. · · · 9 2 2 p 4 RU ∅ which indicates that p is derivable from Γ 2 . Hence, to avoid trivial explanations, line 8 is marked in view of (i) of CMT:
At this stage of the proof, the formula on line 8 is no longer considered as derived.
It is easily observed that, because of line 9, it no longer makes sense to derive explanatory hypotheses for p. Still, one may try to derive an explanation for q. For instance, from lines 2 and 6, one may derive 3 2 t on the condition that t is a good explanation for q:
But, as is clear from the following line
t is not compatible with Γ 2 . Hence, in view of (ii) of RMT, also line 10 has to be marked:
11 2 2 ¬t 5, 9 RU ∅ It is possible, however, to derive an alternative explanation for q, for which it is easily observed that it will not be marked by any of the marking criteria:
Now, suppose one continues the proof as follows:
In that case, it becomes possible to generate u ∨ q as an 'explanation' for q:
However, as soon as one recognizes that u ∨ q is entailed by q, the former is withdrawn in view of CMS:
In a rather similar vein, one may also try to derive, say u ∧ w, as an explanation for q:
However, as soon as it is established that u∧w entails u (which is an alternative, but less complex, explanation for q), 3 2 (u ∧ w) is withdrawn in view of CMP:
In view of the marking criteria, two forms of derivability can be defined: derivability at a stage and final derivability. I say that a line is marked iff it is T -marked, S-marked or P -marked. If the mark of a line is removed, I say that it is unmarked.
Definition 4
A is derived at a stage in an MA-proof from Σ 2 iff A is derived in the proof on a line that is not marked.
Definition 5 A is finally derived in an MA-proof from Σ 2 iff A is derived on a line i that is not marked, and any extension of the proof in which line j is marked may be further extended in such a way that line j is unmarked.
It is easily observed that, in the above example, the formula on line 12 is finally derived. The formula on line 10, however, is derived at stage 10, but is no longer derived at stage 11.
As is usual for adaptive logics, the consequence relation of MA is defined with respect to final derivability:
An Adaptive Logic for Empirical Progress
As was explained in the previous section, the logic LA enables one to generate explanatory hypotheses on the basis of a set of background assumptions and a set of observational statements. It does, however, not take into account the empirical success of the hypotheses. I shall now show what changes are needed to obtain the logic LA k that only generates the maximally successful hypotheses. Like for LA, the proof theory of LA k is defined with respect to some modal adaptive logic that is based on S5
2 . This logic will be called MA k . The relation between MA k and LA k is as that between MA and LA:
Three changes are needed to obtain the proof theory for MA k from that for MA. The first concerns the format and the interpretation of the fifth element of the lines in a proof. If the fifth element of a line is not empty, it will be a triple of the form {A}, Θ, Π in which Θ and Π are sets of closed formulas. Intuitively, Θ stands for the set of empirical successes of A, and Π for its set of empirical problems; the union Θ ∪ Π will be said to be the empirical record of A. A line of the form
will be read as "C provided that A is a good explanation for Θ, Θ ∪ Π is the empirical record of A, and no hypothesis is empirically more successful than A". This new format will enable us to compare the empirical success of alternative explanations, and to mark lines in accordance with this comparison. The second change is related to the conditional rule RC-the premise rule and the unconditional rule are as for MA. The difference with the conditional rule for MA is that one not only 'keeps track' of the empirical successes (confirming instances) but also of the empirical problems (falsifying instances). The basic idea is actually very simple, and best illustrated by means of a propositional example. Consider the following set of premises:
In this case, the explanatory hypothesis s is empirically more successful than the hypothesis r-p is a conforming instance for both, but q is a falsifying one for r.
In MA, this difference will not show: both hypotheses will be derived on a similar condition, namely that they adequately explain p. As a consequence, MA does not offer an easy way to compare the empirical success (in Kuipers' sense) of alternative hypotheses. Things change, however, if it is allowed that 3 2 r is introduced on the condition {r}, {p}, {q} , and 3 2 s on the condition {s}, {p}, ∅ .
20 Thanks to this difference in condition, it becomes possible to observe that r and s share the same empirical success (namely p), but that r moreover faces an empirical problem not faced by s (namely q).
The new conditional rule is a generalization of this basic idea to sets of confirming instances and of falsifying instances: As in the case of MA, it is possible to formulate derived rules that make the proof theory more interesting from a heuristic point of view. Here is the predicative version of RC k that will prove useful for the examples below:
) occur in the proof, then one may add to the proof a line consisting of: (i) the appropriate line number, (ii) 3 2 A(β), (iii) the line numbers of the formulas mentioned in (a)-(c), (iv) "RD k ", and
The last change is that two additional marking criteria are needed-I shall call the first R-marking and the second M -marking. 21 The criterion for Rmarking warrants that a line i, that has {A}, Θ, Π as its fifth element, is marked if, according to one's best insight in premises, the empirical record of A at line i (that is, Θ ∪ Π) is not complete-put more precisely, if there is a line j in the proof such that the empirical record of A at line j is a (real) superset of that at line i:
22
CMR A line that has {A}, Θ, Π as its fifth element is R-marked iff (i) some line in the proof, that is not T -, S-, or P -marked has {A}, Θ , Π as its fifth element, and
The criterion for M -marking warrants that a line i, that has {A}, Θ, Π as its fifth element, is marked if, according to one's best insight in premises, A is not maximally successful-that is, if an alternative explanation C has been derived for which it is established that it saves at least the same successes as A, faces at most the same problems as A, and fares better in at least one of these respects:
23
CMM A line that has {A}, Θ, Π as its fifth element is M -marked iff (i) some line in the proof, that is not T -, S-, P -or R-marked has {C}, Θ , Π as its fifth element (for some C), and (ii) (Θ ⊃ Θ and Π ⊆ Π) or (Θ ⊇ Θ and Π ⊂ Π).
As for MA, I shall say that a line is marked iff it is marked according to one of the above criteria.
At first sight, CMR may seem redundant in view of CMM. Note, however, that the former is needed to ensure that, for a given hypothesis, not only the empirical successes are taken into account, but also the empirical problems. This is illustrated by the following example: 21 The criteria for T -, S-, and P -marking are as for MA, except for the evident change that " {A}, Θ " and " {C}, Θ " have to be replaced systematically by " {A}, Θ, Π " and " {C}, Θ, Π ". 22 The marking criterion will be illustrated by an example below. 23 Compare (ii) of the marking criterion CMM with Kuipers' definition of "empirically more successful" presented in the first section.
As the empirical record for the hypothesis P a is not complete at line 5 (in view of line 7), the former is R-marked. Without this marking, line 7 would be Mmarked in view of line 5. The criterion for M -marking will be illustrated by the examples below.
As in the case of MA, lines that are marked at some stage may at a later stage be unmarked, and some criteria refer to others. Hence, also here the marking has to be performed in some specified way-for instance, by first removing all marks, and, next, checking which lines have to be marked according to, in this order, CMT, CMS, CMP, CMR and CMM.
The definitions of derivability at a stage and final derivability are as for MA, and so is the definition of the consequence relation:
A is derived in the proof on a line that is not marked.
Definition 9
A is finally derived in an MA k -proof from Σ 2 iff A is derived on a line i that is not marked, and any extension of the proof in which line j is marked may be further extended in such a way that line j is unmarked.
I promised in the first section of this paper to enrich Kuipers' static notion of "maximally successful" with a notion of "maximally successful at some moment in time". The latter notion is captured by the definition of derivability at a stage: explanatory hypotheses that are derived at some stage in an MA k -proof are maximally successful relative to the insight in the premises at that stage. Gaining a better insight in the premises (by further analysing them) may lead to a revision of what the maximally successful hypotheses are. Note that this at once gives an additional dimension to Kuipers' notion of empirical progress: explanatory hypotheses are replaced by new and better ones, not on the basis of some absolute criterion that is unrealistic for all interesting cases, but on the basis of one's best available insights.
The dynamic proofs of MA k nicely capture the dynamics of this process of empirical progress. Still, one needs to guarantee that the dynamics is sensible: that different dynamic proofs lead, 'in the end', to the same set of explanatory hypotheses. This is warranted by the definition of final derivability (which corresponds to Kuipers' static notion of "maximally successful").
In order to illustrate the proof theory for MA k , and to compare it with that for MA, let us return to the astronomy example from the previous section.
As we have seen, the logic LA enabled us to derive, from the set of observational statements and the set of background assumptions, two explanatory hypotheses (Sa and Ca) and two predictions (T a and ¬T a). The logic LA k leads to the same result (lines 1-5 are as in the previous section): · · · 6 2 2 (∀x)(Sx ⊃ (Hx ∧ ¬Lx ∧ ¬M x)) 4 RU ∅ 7 3 2 Sa 1-3, 6 RD k {Sa}, {Ha, ¬M a}, {La} 8 3 2 ¬T a 4, 7 RU {Sa}, {Ha, ¬M a}, {La} 9 2 2 (∀x)(Cx ⊃ (Hx ∧ Lx ∧ M x)) 5 RU ∅ 10 3 2 Ca 1-3, 9 RD k {Ca}, {Ha, La}, {¬M a} 11 3 2 T a 5, 10 RU {Ca}, {Ha, La}, {¬M a}
The hypotheses are derived on lines 7 and 10, the predictions on lines 8 and 11. That neither of the hypotheses is withdrawn in view of the other seems justified: their empirical records are incomparable. Suppose, however, that we replace the third premise by M a. In that case, we obtain the following: What this comes to is that the hypothesis Sa is withdrawn in view of the hypothesis Ca, and hence, that also all predictions based on Sa are withdrawn (remember that only formulas on non-marked lines are considered as derived).
Note that all this is in line with Kuipers' analysis. According to his definitions, Ca is empirically more successful than Sa, and hence, the latter should be eliminated in favour of the former.
In Conclusion
In this paper, I presented the ampliative adaptive logic LA k that is based on the modal adaptive logic MA k . I showed that LA k captures the notion of empirical progress as studied by Theo Kuipers. One of the central characteristics of LA k is that it enables one to generate, from a set of observational statement and a set of background assumptions, the most successful explanations.
One of the main results of this paper concerns the proof theory for LA k . Kuipers' definitions adequately capture the concept of empirical progress. However, the latter did not yet have a proof theory that does justice to these definitions. This proof theory is especially important as, at the predicative level, the notion of "most successful" is not only undecidable, there even is no positive test for it. This raises the problem how to come to justified conclusions concerning the empirical success of explanatory hypotheses in undecidable contexts. The proof theory presented here solves that problem: it warrants that the conclusions one derives at a certain stage are justified in view of one's insights in the premises at that stage.
In this paper, I restricted the presentation of LA k to the syntactic level. Evidently, the semantics should be designed, and the soundness and completeness proofs should be formulated. Another important problem concerns the design of alternative systems. LA k only enables one to generate (the most successful) explanations for novel facts (facts not entailed by, but consistent with the theory). However, as Atocha Aliseda has convincingly argued in her [1] , we also need systems to generate explanations for anomalous facts (facts not consistent with the theory). In [18] , an adaptive logic for abduction is presented that is adequate for this. By adjusting this logic along the lines followed in the present paper, a logic for empirical progress may be obtained that is adequate for both novel facts and anomalies. 
